


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Chinese Affairs

~~Secret~~

53

13 November 1973
No. 2253/73

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Anti-Confucius Campaign May be Aimed at Leaders in Current Leadership

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The Chinese are following closely a political campaign that holds serious implications for the future of one or more of China's leaders. The campaign takes the form of an attack on Confucius—dead these 2,400 years, but still a cultural force in China. Lin Piao, who is of course a figure from the recent past, is being accused of having been a "Confucianist," a charge that is being interpreted, both within China and without, as an attack on someone in the current leadership. Indeed, now that Lin has been openly named a traitor, there is no reason to attack him so indirectly. Available evidence suggests that both Chou En-lai and Chiang Ching are somehow involved in the campaign, but the problem is to identify the target. This is a game the Chinese love to play, and participants in study sessions all around China are doing their own guesswork on the subject.

The drive got under way on 7 August with an article in *People's Daily* written by a professor in Canton. The campaign faded during the party congress, but picked up again in mid-September. It is now being vigorously promoted by the media in Peking.

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the campaign already resembles the anti-Lin movement of early 1972 and the attack on the "May 16" group in 1970.

As is always the case when attacks are conducted by historical analogy, the real issues are seen imprecisely, as through a veil. Nevertheless, the argument put forward, particularly in the central media, is surprisingly straightforward and relatively sophisticated. Confucius and his followers are being berated as reactionaries who resist change, obstruct progress, and seek to restore ancient, outmoded ways. They are accused of championing irrelevant and archaic "rites," thereby perpetuating divisiveness in Chinese politics. Above all, they are said to be reactionary in Marxist terms because the policies they espouse are not rooted in the more advanced elements of China's economic base. Those opposed to Confucius, on the other hand, are portrayed as reformers who persistently advocate "progressive measures" in the interest of creating the "new society" and of modernizing and unifying China. These people are depicted as the handmaidens of economically advanced forces in Chinese society. As the campaign has developed, the central media in particular have linked these "progressive" anti-Confucian forces to the towering, if rather menacing, figure of the initial unifier of China, Chin Shih Huang-ti, an unmistakable reference to

Mao, Chin Shih Huang-ti is said to have modernized and unified China by adopting the programs of the anti-Confucianists.

The supposed opposition of the Confucianists to "new things" in the current context, a reference to policies adopted toward the close of the Cultural Revolution--and their interest in "restoring the old" and returning retired officials to office have led many observers to believe that the role of Confucius is being assigned to Chou En-lai. In this scenario, Chou's success in reinstating officials and policies that were prominent before the Cultural Revolution prompted Chiang Ching to launch the anti-Confucius drive in an effort to defend and preserve Cultural Revolution policies and to discredit Chou.

A strong case can also be made that, in the context of the anti-Confucian campaign, those who want to "restore the old" actually want to return to the Cultural Revolution, and that the "reformers" are people like Chou who recognize the need for change and see the policies of the Cultural Revolution as obstacles to progress and modernization. In this interpretation, the objects of the attack would be Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan, the two Politburo members who cling most stubbornly to Cultural Revolution policies.

Several pieces of evidence seem to support the latter view. Confucius is attacked for wanting to "restore families whose line of succession had been broken." Both Chiang Ching, Mao's wife, and Yao, who is thought to be Mao's son-in-law, lost ground at the recent party congress. Although the two would doubtless like to regain the prominence they enjoyed during the Cultural Revolution, Chou En-lai warned unnamed cadres at the party congress that they must accept either higher or lower posts. Peking issued a document earlier this year explaining that the succession is not a "father-son" affair. At study sessions in Canton held in mid-September, when the anti-Confucius drive was gathering steam, cadre reportedly were told that high-ranking officials are chosen on merit, not because they are related to the leader; that, in fact, those related to the leader may be disloyal or incompetent. The anti-Confucius articles contain pejorative references to "hereditary nobility" and "a family tree."

An article in the October issue of *Red Flag* claimed that Chin Shih Huang-ti (the Mao figure) was convinced by his "premier" (probably Chou) that it was necessary to break the Confucianists' "monopoly of culture and education." Cultural developments, the special purview of Chiang Ching, have been at a virtual standstill since the Cultural Revolution despite periodic efforts, under the rubric of letting "100 flowers bloom and 100 schools of thought contend," to induce Chinese artists to start producing again. The Confucianists are portrayed as "removing" the 100 schools of thought and "honoring only the teachings of Confucius." Cultural fare today is dominated by the plays produced under Chiang Ching's tutelage; several of the plays have a woman, possibly representing Chiang Ching, as the main character and the symbol of political rectitude.

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The anti-Confucius campaign is still in its early stages. Its purpose is apparently to discredit, and perhaps purge, the leader under attack. The articles on this question - particularly the early ones - are subject to differing interpretations, and it is possible that each side is trying to turn the campaign against the other. In any case, it appears that leading Chinese personalities - most likely Chou En-lai and Chiang Ching-kuo - are locked in a political struggle, the latest reflection of which is this campaign [redacted]

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Housing for the Urban Dweller

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The Chinese press has been showing considerable interest in the pace of urban housing construction. Chinese spokesmen recently stated that enough units were built during the Third Five-Year Plan (1966-1970) to house about 15 million occupants, and that the average floor space is 4.14 square meters per occupant. This is only about two thirds of the total constructed during the First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) and an average of less than half the floor space built annually during the late 1950s.

Floor Space Construction

(in million square meters)

Period	Total	Average Per Year
1954-57	94.5	18.9
1958-59	52.3	26.2
1966-70	62.0	12.4

The current rate of urban housing construction, while above that of the late 1960s, probably is still substantially lower than during the late 1950s. Costs of construction have increased from about 45 yuan per square meter during the First Five Year Plan to an estimated 70 yuan--a jump of more than 50 percent. The size of China's urban population would make any program to provide adequate housing an expensive undertaking requiring massive diversion of resources from high priority projects.

The shortage of housing in the cities is one reason that China periodically sends large numbers of urban dwellers to the countryside. Even with these transfers of population, the average living space per urban dweller is about 20 percent less than in the early 1950s.

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China's Leaders Compete for Support of Disaffected Youth

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Leaders at opposite ends of the political spectrum appear to be vying for the support of China's disaffected youth. The reinstatement of higher academic standards has alienated some young people, and many others are embittered by their exile to rural areas. The leftists are trying to exploit this discontent by supporting those who want to relax educational criteria. Moderates are trying to mend fences with rusticated youth by promoting measures to improve their living conditions. Some leaders are also courting the Red Guards, an organization now limited to secondary schools which offers young people an alternative to the more tightly controlled Young Communist League.

People's Daily on 19 October published an article from Shanghai that argued strongly for allowing students to copy from one another. The article described the plight of a Red Guard middle school student whose test paper was not accepted because he was caught copying from another Red Guard. What the students called "consultation" and "inspiration" was dismissed by the teacher as "cheating." The issue was debated in big character posters, and it was decided that teachers who refuse a test paper because of "cheating" are oppressing the students.

This judgment has not been widely accepted. Accompanying articles in *People's Daily* said that students may consult each other in some tests, but must work independently in others. The issue is nevertheless gaining national attention. Teachers in Kwangtung reportedly met in late October to discuss the Shanghai incident.

Leftists are apparently trying to capitalize on the momentum built up since last summer when they successfully forced a retreat from the use of college entrance examinations, a move that was probably applauded by down-to-the-countryside youth. By continuing to snipe at policies designed to promote academic excellence, the leftists are looking for allies among students whose scholastic performance is not up to par. Mediocre students were a major source of leftist support during the Cultural Revolution.

A new appeal to young people that tells them they are being oppressed in school and mistreated in the countryside could well find a receptive audience, especially with a politically active Red Guard group to lead the way. The students involved in the recent shouting match in Shanghai, as well as an earlier incident in Sinkiang, were Red Guards, and the leftists seem to be brandishing the Red Guards as a threat. Unlike their disillusioned predecessors who answered leftist calls during the Cultural Revolution only to be banished to the rural areas once the revolution was over, the new generation of Red Guards is politically inexperienced and still idealistic. As such, they are a potential source of leftist support. The moderates last


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summer tried to prevent this support from developing when, for the first time in five years, Peking commemorated the Red Guard anniversary. Peking praised the Red Guards for their past achievements, but cautiously refrained from commenting on their future role in politics.

The moderates are moving forcefully to defuse another potential trouble spot the growing number of restless youths in the countryside. Prodded by Mao, the Central Committee issued a series of instructions designed to improve the lot of these young people and to punish officials who abuse them. Some local officials have resisted the move to improve conditions of the young people, partly because of the financial burden. In response, the party leadership has reportedly issued additional instructions, in the form of a report by Chou En-lai, to deal firmly with officials who fail to follow Peking's orders. Urban youths who have been rounded up in recent weeks for relocation to the countryside are accompanied by local urban officials charged with seeing that rural areas comply with Peking's instructions.

The current maneuvering will probably be affected by the anti-Confucius campaign now in progress. The drive is being most vigorously promoted in those areas where youth problems are the greatest—in the universities and in study sessions on the down-to-the-countryside program. The campaign is clearly aimed at someone in the top leadership; current speculation focuses on Chou En-lai or Chiang Ching. The two are obviously at odds, and each is seeking the allegiance of China's youth.



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Chinese Concern Over West Asia
[REDACTED]

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China is demonstrating concern over rising tensions in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent Iran. The new Daoud government's support for an independent state of Pushtun has strained Afghan relations with Pakistan, and Daoud's encouragement of dissident Baluchi tribesmen has caused trouble with Iran. As a result of recent border skirmishing, both Afghanistan and Iran have reinforced their forces on the Afghan-Iranian frontier. Pakistan has moved regular troops to the border and has alerted its air force; Kabul reportedly has also increased its military preparedness.

China has close ties with Pakistan and a warming friendship with Tehran. Peking made strong commitments to Pakistani territorial integrity following Pakistan's dismemberment in late 1971, in part to discourage external support for tribal separatists.

Chinese leaders appear to be convinced that tensions in the region are a direct result of an aggressive Soviet attempt to improve Moscow's strategic position in South Asia. The Chinese have catalogued these Soviet sins to a long list of foreign officials. Chinese officials claim that the Soviets intend to gain influence in the area and establish permanent access to the Arabian Sea, that they engineered the coup in Afghanistan this summer, and that they actively support separatist operations. Chou En-lai reportedly went so far as to tell [REDACTED] that Moscow intends to unite Baluchi tribesmen living in contiguous areas of the three countries with those in the USSR to form a new state dominated by Moscow.

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Although Peking's assets in the region are limited and the situation along the frontiers seems far short of open conflict, the Chinese continue to make representations to senior foreign diplomats and officials and to urge Iran and Pakistan to establish closer relations. Peking also is supporting Tehran in its aims to consolidate the primacy of Iran over the Persian Gulf in an effort to curb Soviet influence. In addition, the Chinese made a quite friendly gesture to Turkey when Chou himself recently attended a Turkish National Day reception in Peking.

In the interest of maintaining a rough regional power balance, Peking may well have privately welcomed the entry of a US naval task force in the Indian Ocean area as a restraining influence on Moscow. The Chinese public reaction was tepid and indirect. It amounted to replaying a Tanzanian protest and a Ceylonese article protesting the presence of both Soviet and American warships in the Indian Ocean.

A reported Soviet arms grant to Kabul could further complicate Peking's position. Although the ill-trained Afghan army would be no match for Pakistan, substantial Soviet arms shipments could trigger a Pakistani request for aid that Peking would find difficult to turn down. A Chinese grant to Pakistan, in turn, could damage prospects for an early Chinese rapprochement with India and possibly lead to an Indian request for matching aid from Moscow. [REDACTED]

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SECRET**Sino-Japanese Negotiations in Slow Motion**

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The Chinese are still pushing the Japanese to conclude a civil aviation agreement, the most important and most troublesome of the four bilateral agreements now being negotiated. After making tough demands at the outset of the negotiations earlier this year, Peking has now reduced its requirements to two: that Tokyo force Taipei to change the name of China Airlines and that the planes cease flying the Nationalist flag. The Japanese are prepared to set up a dummy firm, ostensibly to replace Japan Airlines flights to Taiwan.

Acceptance of these demands would allow the substance of Japan's lucrative air traffic to continue, altering only the form of the interchange. In fact, China may believe its demands are so reasonable that Tokyo could reject them only at the risk of appearing inflexible.

The Japanese have gone through the motions of accepting Peking's proposal and have presented it to Taipei. Here, of course, is the sticking point. Taipei refuses to accept this arrangement for the same reason that it appeals to Peking: Taiwan's international status would be reduced yet another notch. Convinced that Tokyo is more interested in the immediate profits from its air links with Taiwan than any long-range gains from new ties with Peking, the Nationalists have told the Japanese that they will break off all present flights rather than change the name of their airline or flag on its planes.

The Tanaka government is concerned that if it twists Taipei's arm, the pro-Taiwan faction in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party would be roused to active opposition. Given Tanaka's many other domestic problems, he is unwilling to go all-out at this time to get an air agreement with Peking. In fact, the Japanese have asked Peking to understand their "delicate" position, and the Chinese have not pressed Tokyo as hard as they might have.

The result is continuing stalemate. In September, Peking proposed an exchange of visits between Japanese and Chinese foreign ministers before the end of 1973. In the circumstances, even if such visits come off, it is difficult to imagine that an aviation agreement could be concluded. It is more likely that a trade agreement would be concluded.

The lack of urgency in Sino-Japanese negotiations is in large measure a result of the relative satisfaction of both sides with the present arrangement. China's key diplomatic goal was accomplished last fall when Tokyo broke off ambassadorial relations with Taiwan and recognized Peking. Neither Peking nor Tokyo is displeased with the level of economic interchange. Despite the absence of the formal accords foreseen in 1972, trade between the two countries will expand to over \$2 billion in 1973, over twice the amount of the previous year.

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CHRONOLOGY

28 Oct-3 Nov Chinese Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Sha Feng attends celebration of 50th anniversary of Turkish Republic in Ankara. (U)

31 Oct Sudanese Foreign Minister Mansur Khalid ends visit to the PRC. (U)

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1 Nov British parliamentarians arrive in Peking. (U)

3 Nov Chinese delegation led by Sun So-chang ends visit to Argentina without signing trade agreement. (U)

3 Nov Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua returns to Peking after heading PRC delegation to annual UN General Assembly session in New York. (U)

3-7 Nov Chinese aircraft transport Pathet Lao to Luang Prabang as part of implementation of Lao settlement. (U)

4-6 Nov North Vietnamese delegation headed by Premier Pham Van Dong stops in Peking en route to Hanoi from Eastern Europe; greeted and feted by Chou En-lai; seen off by Yeh Chien-ying. (U)

6-10 Nov President Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone visits Peking. (U)

8 Nov Delegation of the National Council for US-China Trade, which arrived in Peking on 4 November, is received by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien on 8 November. (U)

8 Nov A photograph, taken at Mao's request, shows Wang Hung-wen on Mao's right with Sierra Leone President between them and Chou on Mao's left. This is the first time Wang has been given such prominence in a photograph. (U)

9 Nov Khmer insurgent envoy Ieng Sary feted by Chou En-lai at banquet in Peking before returning to Cambodian interior. (U)

10 Nov Secretary Kissinger arrives in Peking for three-day visit. Received by Chou En-lai and Mao. (U)

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